2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

7-22-2004

Begum v. Atty Gen USA

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004

Recommended Citation
"Begum v. Atty Gen USA" (2004). 2004 Decisions. 471.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/471

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-2317

NANTHI BEGUM,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General
of the United States
Respondent

On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A73-162-793)

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 1, 2004
Before: AMBRO, ALDISERT and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 22, 2004 )

OPINION

AM BRO, Circuit Judge
Nanthi Begum petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) to affirm denial by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of her applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). Central to the IJ’s decision was his finding that Begum’s claims of a wellfounded fear of persecution upon return to her native country were not credible. Because
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, we deny
her petition for review.
I.

Facts and Procedural Posture

Begum, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, entered the United States in December
1992. Eight months later, she filed an initial application for asylum claiming that she was
compelled to leave Bangladesh because she feared the government would arrest her for
membership in the Jatiyo political party. In April 2000, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service1 (“INS”) issued Begum a notice to appear, charging her with
removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien who entered the United States
without inspection or parole. At a hearing before the IJ, Begum conceded removability
but requested relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection,
and in the alternative voluntary departure. She submitted a new asylum application
explaining that because she had organized poor and illiterate women on behalf of the

1

As a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135 (2002), the INS has since ceased to exist as an agency within the Department of
Justice and its enforcement functions have been transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security.
2

Jatiyo Party, she and her family had been subject to assaults and threats by religious
fundamentalists.
After a merits hearing in July 2001, the IJ denied all of Begum’s requested relief
because he did not find her claims to be credible. He even denied her voluntary departure
relief, finding that because of her false testimony she lacked good moral character. In
April 2003 the BIA affirmed the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief, but vacated the denial of voluntary departure.2
II.

Analysis

Begum now appeals the decision of the BIA. Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s
credibility finding, we review the IJ’s finding for whether “any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Put another
way, we will sustain the IJ’s finding, and thus affirm the BIA’s decision, if the IJ’s
finding was supported by substantial evidence. Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 265,
278 (3d Cir. 2004). In the context of adverse credibility findings such as the one at issue
here, we give “substantial deference” when “specific cogent reasons” support the finding.
Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).
The IJ found that Begum could not establish a well-founded fear of persecution, as

2

Begum does not appeal from the BIA’s grant of thirty-day voluntary departure period.
She does, however, seek a stay of the departure period pending this appeal (i.e.,
permission to depart within 30 days of this decision). Though the thirty-day voluntary
departure period had long since lapsed before she sought a stay, we nonetheless grant this
request.
3

required for the discretionary relief of asylum, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a),
because her testimony was incredible.3 The IJ offered several “specific cogent reasons”
to support his adverse credibility finding.
First, he noted discrepancies in Begum’s hearing testimony about various
encounters with members of the rival fundamentalist Jamat Islam Party. In describing an
incident in which Jamat Islam Party members broke into her home, she first testified that
the event occurred in June 1990 and later testified that it occurred in June 1992. She
offered precise testimony about when she fled her home, 11:10 p.m., but could only
narrow the date of the attack down to a particular month.4 In describing a second incident
in which Begum and a co-worker were attacked in a rickshaw by unknown individuals,
she again testified precisely as to time of day, 9:15 a.m., but vaguely as to date, stating
that it occurred sometime in May 1992.
Next, the IJ noted discrepancies between Begum’s hearing testimony and her
initial application for asylum that she filed in 1993. Her application did not report any of

3

Because the IJ found Begum ineligible for asylum, he did not need to consider
whether she met the higher standard of proof required for withholding of removal. He
also concluded that the adverse credibility finding prevented her from establishing that it
was more likely than not that she would be tortured if returned to Bangladesh, as required
for CAT relief.
4

The IJ also noted that Begum testified on direct examination that she fled her home
through a window, but on cross-examination said she left through a back door. On
appeal, Begum claims that this apparent discrepancy resulted from a mistranslation. Even
assuming that this issue is properly resolved in Begum’s favor, substantial evidence still
supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.
4

her children, but at the hearing she testified that she has three children, all of whom were
born before 1993. Also, her application does not mention the break-in, the rickshaw
incident, or the rival Jamat Islam Party, all of which she testified form the basis of her
well-founded fear of persecution.
Begum’s second asylum application, filed in 2000, also contradicted her hearing
testimony. While the application stated that her home was broken into by Jamat Islam
Party members in May 1992, she testified at the hearing that a break-in occurred in June
1992 (after earlier stating June 1990). The IJ did not believe her proffered explanation
for the inconsistency—that there were two separate break-ins, one in May 1992 and one
in June 1992—because the initial application reported only one. Begum explained that
she only reported the May 1992 break-in because she was at home when it happened, but
that she was not at home for the June 1992 break-in. But this explanation contradicted
her earlier testimony that during the June 1992 attack she fled from her house at 11:10
p.m. Also, her application stated that the rickshaw incident occurred on June 22, 1992,
but she testified that it occurred sometime in May 1992. And while the asylum
application claimed that her father had been held at knife-point in his home by Islamic
fundamentalists, she testified at that hearing that her father had not experienced problems
with Jamat Islam Party members. Begum’s testimony also contradicted affidavits in the
record. She testified that she was a Jatiyo Party field worker, but a third-party’s affidavit
stated that she was a “joint secretary” of the Party.

5

The IJ found that Begum’s claims of political involvement were also undermined
by her lack of knowledge about Bangladesh’s recent political history. Even though she
alleged that she joined the Jatiyo Party soon after it was established, Begum could not
accurately testify when the Jatiyo Party was established. She also testified that Khaleda
Zia became the president of Bangladesh in 1990, while the State Department report in the
record says that this occurred in March 1991.
Finally, the IJ found that Begum’s demeanor was not one of a person who was
telling the truth. He noted that she fidgeted and picked at her fingers during the
Government’s “difficult” questions on cross-examination.
Begum argues on appeal that the IJ can only base a false testimony determination
on statements made under oath at the hearing, and thus improperly considered the
contents of her application, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) and Kungys v. United States, 485
U.S. 759, 780 (1988). Under § 1101(f)(6), an alien will not be regarded as having “good
moral character” if she has presented false testimony. But the good moral character
finding is a predicate to certain forms of relief—like naturalization, see 8 U.S.C. §
1427(a)(3), and suspension of removal, see former 8 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1)—which are not
at issue here. In Begum’s case, the IJ did not deny her asylum application on the basis of
a finding that she lacked good moral character, so he was not limited to considering only
her statements under oath. Consequently, Begum’s argument that the IJ did not properly
make a false testimony determination, because he considered more than just her testimony

6

under oath, is not relevant to the issue on appeal.5
III.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the IJ’s “specific cogent reasons” for not believing Begum’s
claims of persecution amount to substantial evidence required to support an adverse
credibility finding. All of the inconsistencies and omissions between and within her
testimony and her asylum applications undermine Begum’s claim that she fears
persecution in Bangladesh on account of her political opinion. The BIA correctly
affirmed the IJ’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. We
therefore deny Begum’s petition for review.

5

Begum also complains that the IJ did not admit six police reports because they had not
been certified as required under 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(b). We reject Begum’s unsupported
argument that the IJ should have permitted her to explain what efforts, if any, were made
to secure the proper certification because the certification requirement under § 287.6(b) is
mandatory.
7

